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measures and terror activity is heavily altered by recruitment.
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Introduction 
Can highly efficient counterterror measures curb terrorism? Despite intensive 
counterterror efforts against terror networks, the threat from these networks 
remains significant and constantly mutating.1 The strategic interplay between 
counterterror measures and terror activity is complex. Terrorism is a dynamic 
process, especially in the context of how it responds to counterterror measures.2 
Dynamic considerations may arise from the coevolution of terrorism and 
counterterrorism. A cursory look at offensive counterterror measures and the 
incidents of terrorism highlight this interaction. Figure 1 shows that drone attacks 
against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen hit its highest casualty 
in 2012. Accordingly, the incident of AQAP’s terrorist activity peaked in both 2012 
and 2015.3 There was a drop in the incident of AQAP’s activity in 2013; however, in 
2015, AQAP increased its operation.  
 
In counterterror planning, it is not only important to estimate the rise of terror 
activity or how such activity may respond to counterterror measures, but also to 
identify the key ingredient that sustains it. The main resource of any terror group is 
its militants, recruited from the pool of its supporters.4 Brito and Intriligator 
identified recruitment as the primary variable in sustaining guerrilla warfare.5 
Whereas Brito and Intriligator concentrate on guerrilla warfare and its territorial 
properties, herein, we focus on the dynamic interplay between counterterror 
measures and terror activity. Can highly efficient counterterror measures contain 
terror activity at all levels of recruitment? We argue that extremely efficient 
counterterror measures can contain terror activity if recruitment remains low. This is 
because soaring recruitment can override the impact of highly efficient counterterror 
measures.  
 
                                                        
1 Kumar Ramakrishna, “Terrorism Trends and Challenges: Understanding the Emergence of Al 
Qaeda Galaxy,” The Journal of Defense and Security 5:1 (2014): 1-7, available at: 
http://search.proquest.com/openview/0c79c23b37eb77b9b5c306ae294486d3/1?pq-
origsite=gscholar&cbl=1456373 
2 Michael D. Porter, Gentry White and Lorraine Mazerolle, “Innovative Methods for Terrorism 
and Counterterrorism Data,” in Evidence-Based Counterterrorism Policy, ed. Cynthia Lum and 
Leslie W. Kennedy (Springer: New York, 2012), 91-112.  
3 “National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START),” 
available at: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. 
4 João R. Faria and Daniel G. Arce M., “Terror Support and Recruitment,” Defense and Peace 
Economics 16, no. 4 (2005): 263-273. doi:10.1080/1024269052000344855. 
5 Dagobert L. Brito, and Michael D. Intriligator, “Deterring Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” 
Economic Affairs 17, no. 4 (1997): 4-9. doi:10.1111/1468-0270.00051. 
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Crenshaw notes that recruitment is a necessity for terror group to survive over time.6 
Terror organizations heavily rely on non-structured recruitment to guide the 
committed into its fold for further training and indoctrination.7 For example, 
Sageman states that Al Qaeda never entrusted much effort into a comprehensive 
recruitment drive, instead it relied heavily on non-structured recruitment to guide 
the committed.8 Indeed, the non-structured recruitment is a critical element in the 
advancement of Global Jihad.9 If restraining recruitment has a large impact on the 
success rate of counterterror measures, managing it should be prioritized.  
 
This matters for key ongoing debate on efficient counterterror policies to curb 
terrorism efficaciously. We hypothesize that only under conditions of restrained 
recruitment highly efficient counterterror measures can effectively contain terrorism. 
This insight can help governments develop more effective strategies and to invest its 
valuable scarce resources in curtailing recruitment. Herein, we uncover a simple 
dynamic model that estimates the strategic interplay between counterterror 
measures and terror activity. The rest of the article proceeds as follows. First, we 
provide a brief review of the literature; second, we introduce our baseline model and 
conduct computer simulations; third, we present our main findings; and finally we 
conclude.  
 
Figure 1. Drone wars (International Security 2012).10 
  
 
                                                        
6 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative politics 13, no. 4 (1981): 379-399, 
available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/421717. 
7 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2004), 201-202. 
8 Michael Taarnby, “Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe: Trends and Perspectives,” 
(Research Report funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice, January 14, 2005), available at: 
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/58.pdf.  
9 Ibid. 
10 This data is available at: http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/yemen-
analysis.html#page9). 
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A Brief Review of Literature  
Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence in order to obtain a 
political objective.11 Earlier terrorism research focused on the definition of terrorism, 
the myriad causes of terrorism, terror tactics, and the identity of terror 
organizations.12 Rapoport first distinguished terrorism from other forms of political 
violence.13 Thornton defined terrorism in the context of internal war and as “a 
symbolic act designed to influence political behavior by extranormal means, entailing 
the use or threat of violence.”14 Other experts focused on the evolution of terror 
groups as a type of social movement.15 The literature on social movements posits 
terrorism may appear at the end of a cycle of the rise and fall of movements of mass 
protest.16 Others note that local causes cannot explain global waves, and while 
ideology is a necessary ingredient, it does not explain it.17 
 
Long-term analysis of terrorism trends indicate that transnational terror attacks run 
in cycles with peaks approximately every two years.18 Rapoport argues that over the 
course of modern history, characterized by expansion and contraction, waves of 
international terror activity last about a generation.19 Rapoport notes that, since the 
late 19th century, terror attacks can be divided into four waves.20 A wave is defined as 
a cycle of activity in a given time period with expansion and contraction phases.21 
Townshend suggests that the idea of waves of terrorism has the capacity to identify 
the evolution as well as the massing of terrorist events: the peaks and troughs of the 
waveforms echo the periods when terrorist action has intensified, peaked, and 
                                                        
11 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press, 2006), 303-16. 
12 Todd Sandler, “The Analytical Study of Terrorism Taking Stock,” Journal of Peace Research 51, 
no. 2 (2013): 257–71. doi: 10.1177/0022343313491277. 
13 David C. Rapoport, Assassination & Terrorism (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 
1971). 
14 Thomas P. Thornton, “Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation,” Terrorism-Critical Concepts 
in Political Science 3 (1964): 41-64, available at: 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=63496. 
15 Ted R. Gurr, “Sources of Rebellion in Western Societies: Some Quantitative Evidence,” The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 391, no. 1 (1970): 128-144, 
available at: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/000271627039100111. 
16 Martha Crenshaw, “How Terrorism Declines,” Terrorism and Political Violence 3, no. 1 (1991): 
69-87. doi:10.1080/09546559108427093. 
17 Mark Sedgwick, “Inspiration and the Origins of Global Waves of Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism 30, no. 2 (2007): 97-112. doi:10.1080/10576100601101042. 
18 Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, “After 9/11 Is it all Different Now?,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 49, no. 2 (2005): 259-277, Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30045111. 
19 David C. Rapoport, ‘The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements 
of a Grand Strategy, ed. Audrey Cronin and James Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2004) 46–73.  
20 David C. Rapoport, “Terrorism,” in Encyclopedia of government and politics, ed. Mary 
Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan (London: Routledge, 1992) 1064. 
21 Sedgwick, “Inspiration and the Origins of Global Waves of Terrorism,” 98. 
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eventually diminished.22 However, a single explain-all solution for the complex 
problem of the transformation of terrorism remains open.23 For example, Proshyn 
notes the activity of terror groups is not conducted in parallel with the dynamics of 
its waves.24 Johnson et al. find a power-law like acceleration curves in the delay 
between events.25 It is argued that this pattern is caused by a red queen effect, in 
which two sides of the conflict race through some abstract space, and the timing 
between events is given by how far ahead the insurgent is in the race.26 Others 
suggest terror activities conform to a temporal pattern that can provide insight into 
terror attack frequencies.27 Johnson et al. uncover a dynamical pattern that may be 
used to estimate the escalation rate and timing of fatal attacks.28 They argue that the 
time difference between fatal attacks by insurgent groups within individual provinces 
in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and by terrorist groups operating worldwide, gives a 
potent indicator of the later pace of lethal activity. Clauset and Gleditsch identify 
patterns in the frequency and severity of violent attacks by aging terror groups.29 The 
authors’ analyses of terror events worldwide from 1968–2008 shows that the 
production of violent events tends to accelerate with increasing size. 
 
Turning to the trends in the terrorist recruitment process, one aspect should be 
emphasized, that of top-down recruitment.30 Absence of any top-down recruitment, 
joining the Jihad centers on impromptu formed clusters.31 Mair argues that virtually 
any country in the world has some potential as a recruitment pool; however, any 
meaningful pool requires at least three elements:  
1. A lack of state capacity (particularly in the spheres of intelligence and law 
enforcement);  
2. A mobilizing belief, such as Salafist/jihadist extremism; and  
3. Agitators who can propagate those beliefs.32 On a global scale this 
                                                        
22 Charles Townshend, “Wave and Strain,” Terrorism and Political Violence 28, no. 2 (2016): 
225-227. doi:10.1080/09546553.2015.1112280. 
23 Denys Proshyn, “Breaking the Waves: How the Phenomenon of European Jihadism Militates 
Against the Wave Theory of Terrorism,” International Studies. Interdisciplinary Political and 
Cultural Journal 17, no. 1 (2015): 91-107. doi:10.1515/ipcj-2015-0007. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Neil Johnson et al., “Pattern in Escalations in Insurgent and Terrorist Activity,” Science 333, 
no. 6038 (2011): 81-84. doi:10.1126/science.1205068. 
26 Aaron Clauset, Maxwell Young and Kristian S. Gleditsch, “A novel Explanation of the Power-
Law form of the Frequency of Severe Terrorist Events: Reply to Saperstein,” Peace Economics, 
Peace Science and Public Policy 16, no. 1 (2010): 1-7. doi:10.2202/1554-8597.1213. 
27 Audrey K. Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” 
International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 7-48. doi:10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.7. 
28 Johnson et al., “Pattern in Escalations in Insurgent and Terrorist Activity,” 81-84. 
29 Aaron Clauset et al., “A Novel Explanation of the Power-Law,” 1-7. 
30 Taarnby, “Recruitment of Islamist terrorists in Europe,” 24. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Stefan Mair, “Terrorism and Africa: On the Danger of Further Attacks in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 
African Security Studies 12, no. 1 (2003): 107-110. doi:10.1080/10246029.2003.9627576. 
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spontaneously formed clusters has resulted in a profusion of loosely 
connected networks.33  
This pattern of unstructured growth has immense ramifications as the strength of 
weak ties makes counterterror efforts difficult since it is infeasible to rattle an 
organizational structure that does not exist.34  
 
The recruitment process is not an isolated phenomenon but is inherently linked to 
issues like marginalization and questions of identity.35 Empirical analyses have 
shown that indiscriminate repressive actions result in more terror attacks, whereas 
indiscriminate conciliatory actions result in fewer attacks.36 Sandler notes that 
proactive responses against a terror threat may unleash backlash if terrorist 
supporters view such actions as excessive, thereby resulting in new recruits.37 When 
this occurs, the positive benefits from proactive actions are reduced by the backlash 
costs.  
 
Few scholars have investigated counterterrorism effectiveness of retaliatory raids.38 
Enders and Sandler found an intertemporal substitution, where terrorists moved 
attacks planned for the future to the present to protest the raids.39 Thus, terror 
attacks rose following raids and declined months later as terrorists had to replenish 
exhausted resources.40 Lum et al. studied the evaluation research on counterterror 
interventions, and found that not only some interventions did not achieve the 
outcomes sought; at times they even increased the likelihood of terrorism 
occurring.41 Siqueira and Sandler focused on the strategic interplay between a terror 
                                                        
33 Taarnby, “Recruitment of Islamist terrorists in Europe,” 23. 
34 Ibid., 25. 
35  Ibid., 49. 
36 Laura Dugan and Erica Chenoweth, “Moving Beyond Deterrence: The Effectiveness of Raising 
the Expected Utility of Abstaining from Terrorism in Israel,” American Sociological Review 77:4 
(2012): 597-624. doi:10.1177/0003122412450573. 
37 Todd Sandler, “The Analytical Study of Terrorism Taking Stock,” Journal of Peace 
Research 51:2 (2014): 257-71. doi:10.1177/0022343313491277. 
38 Peter B. Rosendorff and Todd Sandler. "Too Much of a Good Thing? The Proactive Response 
Dilemma,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 5 (2004): 657-671, available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4149814; Kevin Siqueira and Todd Sandler, “Terrorist Backlash, 
Terrorism Mitigation, and Policy Delegation,” Journal of Public Economics 91, no. 9 (2007): 
1800-1815. doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.02.005. 
39 Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, “The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-
Autoregression-Intervention Analysis,” American Political Science Review 87:4 (1993): 829-844. 
doi:10.2307/2938817. 
40 Todd Sandler, “Counterterrorism: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
49:2 (2005): 183-200, available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30045107.  
41 Cynthia Lum, Leslie W. Kennedy and Alison Sherley, “Are Counter-Terrorism Strategies 
Effective? The Results of the Campbell Systematic Review on Counter-Terrorism Evaluation 
Research,” Journal of Experimental Criminology 2:4 (2006): 489-516. doi:10.1007/s11292-006-
9020-y. 
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group and a government as they both vie for grassroots support.42 They found that 
when terrorists and the government act contemporaneously, the equilibrium 
outcome depends on the effectiveness of the government’s counter measures.  
 
The Current Study 
The specification of an accurate model including most relevant factors is a 
prerequisite for a useful model; the particular challenge is that it can be difficult to 
select the relevant factors for inclusion in a conceptual model, and to define the form 
of the relationships between all of the factors mathematically.43 Most efforts in this 
direction have relied on models from the time series or survival analysis.44 Herein, 
we employ mathematical analysis and System Dynamics simulations. Using these 
measures, we study how terror activity varies over time in reaction to counterterror 
measures. The simulation results yield new and interesting insights into the growth 
and stagnation of terror activity and the challenges it poses for counterterrorism 
agencies. In the following section, we present the model.  
 
Model 
Let N be the number of terror activities, and C the number of counterterror measures 
(e.g. military and police) employed by counterterror agencies to curb the threat of 
terrorism. N and C interact over time 𝑡 = 0, 1, 2, … 𝑛. Parameter 𝑟 is the rate at which 
individuals can become recruited into terror organizations. The evolving terror 
activity is given by 
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑡
=  ∇𝑟 + [𝜇1(ψΝ) − 𝜇2(ψ𝐶)] where ψΝ and ψ𝐶 are functions 
describing changes in terrorism and counterterrorism proliferation and deduction; 
𝜇1 and 𝜇2 denote the rate of change. Terror curve (𝕋), incorporates the summation of 
all activities at a point in time, and is triggered by a disturbance (𝜘), where the force 
(?⃗?) of the curve is given by ?⃗?(𝜘, 𝑡) = ω (𝜘;  𝜆); ω is a function denoting how the 
strength of ?⃗? varies across time and 𝜆 which, captures the interaction between 
terrorism and counterterrorism activities. Therefore, total ?⃗? at any point in time is 
 ∴ ?⃗⃗?𝑡 = ∫ ω (𝜘;  𝜆) 𝑑𝜘. Reaction to terror activities can vary in accordance to their 
threat level (𝜏). Counterterrorism agencies’ response is denoted by ?̃?: [0, ∞] →
                                                        
42 Siqueira and Sandler, “Terrorist Backlash, Terrorism Mitigation, and Policy Delegation,” 1800-
1815. 
43 Porter, White, and Mazerolle, “Innovative Methods for Terrorism and Counterterrorism Data,” 
91-112. 
44 Carlos P. Barros, “An Intervention Analysis of Terrorism: The Spanish ETA Case,” Defense and 
Peace Economics 14:6 (2003): 401-412. doi:10.1080/1024269032000085170; Gary LaFree, 
Laura Dugan and Raven Korte, “Is Counter Terrorism Counterproductive? Northern Ireland 
1969–1992,” Criminology 47:1 (2009): 501-530, available at: 
https://ccjs.umd.edu/sites/ccjs.umd.edu/files/pubs/Published%20Article%20Northern%20Irela
nd.pdf. 
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ℝ. Hence, θ(𝜏;  𝜆) =
θ̃(𝜏
𝜆
)
𝜆
 ∴ ∫ θ̃(𝜏;  𝜆)𝑑𝜏 = 𝜆. Thus, the normalized campaign function is 
parameterized by 𝜆.  
 
Our computer simulation is based on a modified adaptation of the Lotka-Voltera.45 
Specifically, we employ the predator-prey model.46 The Lotka-Volterra model 
parameters specify a dynamic system.47 This model is a fine baseline structure to 
probe the impact of interaction between terrorism and counterterrorism.48 Tsebelis 
and Sprague adapted the predator-prey model to the problem of revolution and 
coercion in order to capture the dynamic characteristics of the interactions between 
the state and rebels.49 We assume that terror organizations need recruits to conduct 
their activities; N can increase at a rate 𝑑𝑁 =  𝑟𝑁𝑑𝑡 over time.  
 
In a study by Asal and Rethemeyer, the authors found that organizational 
characteristics such as size and alliance connections are important predictors of 
terror group lethality.50 Here, we incorporate a term for alliances (𝜁), since alliances 
can support terror organizations’ activities. We assume that counterterror measures 
confront terror activities at a rate(𝜑), 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 ∴ 𝑑𝑁 = − 𝜑 𝑁 𝐶𝜁𝑑𝑡. Agencies can reduce 
counterterror measures at a rate (𝑑𝐶), where 𝑑𝐶 = − 𝜇𝐶𝛾; 𝜇 is the rate at which 
agencies reduce operations and 𝛾 denotes the level of counterterror spending. 
Herein, spending reflects both the depth and scope in the funding of 
counterterrorism programs in order to detect, prevent, deter, and reduce the risk of 
terror-related violence. 𝐶 inflates at rate 𝛼 when 𝑑𝐶 =  𝛼𝑁𝐶𝜗𝑑𝑡; 𝜗 denotes the rate at 
which counterterror measures efficiency expands. The result of these assumptions is 
a set of two coupled differential equations: 
(
𝑑𝑁 𝑑𝑡⁄ = 𝑟𝑁 −  𝜑𝑁𝐶𝜁
𝑑𝐶 𝑑𝑡 =⁄ − 𝜇𝐶 +  𝛼𝑁𝐶𝜗
)   
 
                                                        
45 Alfred J. Lotka, “Contribution to the Theory of Periodic Reactions,” The Journal of Physical 
Chemistry 14:3 (1910): 271-274. doi:10.1021/j150111a004; Vito Volterra, Theory of Functionals 
(London and Glasgow: Blackie and Sons, 1930). 
46 “NetLogo Wolf Sheep Predation (Docked Hybrid) Model,” Center for Connected Learning and 
Computer-Based Modeling, available at: 
http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/models/WolfSheepPredation(DockedHybrid).  
47 Hiroyuki Matusda, Peter A. Abrams, and Michio Hori, “The Effect of Adaptive Anti-Predator 
Behavior on Exploitative Competition and Mutualism between Predators,” Oikos (1993): 549-559. 
doi:10.2307/3544924. 
48 Ronald A Francisco, “Coercion and Protest: An Empirical Test in Two Democratic States,” 
American Journal of Political Science 40:4 (1996): 1179-1204. doi:10.2307/2111747. 
49 George Tsebelis and John Sprague, “Coercion and Revolution: Variations on a Predator-Prey 
Model,” Mathematical and Computer Modeling 12:4 (1989): 547-559. doi:10.1016/0895-
7177(89)90424-X. 
50 Victor Asal and Karl R. Rethemeyer, “The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and 
the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks,” The Journal of Politics 70:2 (2008): 437-449. 
doi:10.1017/S0022381608080419. 
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Results 
We examine two distinct anti-terror policies: Inefficient and efficient. The modeler 
presents the emergent aggregate level behavior of terror activities and counterterror 
measures. The simulation results of the System Dynamics modeler draw the peaks 
and troughs of both counterterror and terror activities.51 Several manipulations of 
the parameter values of the model are implemented in the simulations below. 
 
Simulations 
Inefficient Counterterror Measures (VIa). 
We set the efficiency of counterterror measures (𝜗) and terrorist recruitment (𝑟) at 
some low value (𝜗 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 0.04). Terror 𝑓 (𝑡) and counterterror 𝑓′(𝑡) curves 
intersect twice (see figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Terrorism and counterterrorism agencies’ dual equilibria 
 
 
Points A and B are local equilibria points. The level of counterterror measure is lower 
on the left side of point B but exponentially overtakes 𝑓 (𝑡) on the right side of B. We 
name point B a counterterror trap. The segment between A and B is the terror 
funnel. The terror funnel denotes the period where terror enterprises enjoy gains and 
counterterror agencies lag behind. At point B, counterterror agencies overtake terror 
activities; for the terrorists, the curve becomes steeper, while counterterror measures 
rise exponentially. The discrepancy between terrorists’ high level of activity and 
counterterrorism’s low response level in the terror funnel is denoted the terror trap 
(Ξ).  
                                                        
51 NetLogo 5.3.1 User Manual, available at: 
http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/5.0/docs/systemdynamics.html. 
A	
B	
α	 β	
Ƒ	(t)	
Ƒ’	(t)	
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Thus, Ξ = ∫ 𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝛽
𝛼
− ∫ 𝑓′(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝛽
𝛼
 is where counterterror measures lags behind terror 
activities. In VIa, the time to reach the first equilibrium (point A) is long (40 time 
units); point B is reached at 110 (time units). Measurement of time is built on units, 
but is not specific to years, months, days, hours, or minutes. Time represents the unit 
itself, rather than the nature of the unit. Thus, when comparing the utility of various 
counterterror measures, we are intensely concerned with the length of time. This 
allows us to compare the relative utility of various counterterror measures. Thus, the 
terror funnel is large (70 time units). In this scenario, terror enterprises enjoy a long 
period of activity (figure 3). Terror activities reach above 500. 
 
Figure 3. Low efficiency counterterror measures and low recruitment 
     
 
Inefficient Counterterror Measures (VIb).  
Next, we increase recruitment into terror groups by 164 percent while controlling for 
𝜗 (𝜗 = 0.5, 𝑟 = 0.4).52 Because recruitment into terror groups is high, the time it takes 
to reach point A is shorter (four time units) and the terror funnel is smaller than in 
VIa. However, terror activity is 174 percent higher than in VIa. This suggests that 
while terror enterprises enjoy a short terror funnel, these enterprises exhibit a high 
level of activity (figure 4).  
 
                                                        
52 All benchmark values of the model are derived from Wilensky (2005) and adjusted to our 
model. See NetLogo Wolf Sheep Predation (System Dynamics) model, available at: 
http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/models/WolfSheepPredation(SystemDynamics); Wilensky 
(1999) available at: http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/; here the percent difference for our 
benchmark is calculated as (| 0.04 - 0.4 | / ((0.04 + 0.4)/2))*100.  
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Figure 4. Low efficiency counterterror measures and high recruitment 
    
 
Efficient Counterterror Measures (VIc). 
In this scenario, we increase the efficiency of counterterror measures by 75 percent 
while keeping recruitment level at a low value (𝜗 = 1.1, 𝑟 = 0.04). The simulation 
results show that the counterterror curve builds a tangent with the terror curve and 
thus, avoids the creation of a terror trap. Only here, terrorism is contained (figure 5). 
Thus, terror activities are effectively managed by the counterterror measures.  
 
Figure 5. High efficiency counterterror measures and low recruitment 
     
 
Efficient Counterterror Measures (VId).  
Finally, we test the interplay between high recruitment and highly efficient 
counterterror measures (𝜗 = 1.1, 𝑟 = 0.4). We find that the time it takes to reach the 
counterterror trap (Point B) is short (14 time units); thus, a small terror funnel is 
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created. Terror activity is 78  percent lower than VIb but higher than VIa and VIc. 
Under this condition, highly efficient counterterror measures can significantly 
reduce the time span of terror activity–even though recruitment into terror groups is 
still high (figure 6).  
 
Figure 6. High efficiency counterterror measures and high recruitment 
      
 
Conclusion 
The strategic interaction between counterterror measures and terror activity is 
complex. Our model depicts this dynamic interaction. We find that under conditions 
of inefficient counterterror measures, terror groups enjoy longer periods of activity. 
For this condition to hold, recruitment into terror groups must remain restrained. 
Inflated recruitment shortens the period of activity but boosts the number of such 
enterprises. Highly efficient counterterror measures can effectively contain terror 
activity, but only if recruitment remains restrained. Thus, recruitment profoundly 
alters the trajectory of the dynamics between counterterror measures and terror 
activity. We conclude that highly efficient counterterror measures can be remarkably 
successful, if recruitment into terror groups remains depressed. 
 
The interplay between counterterror measures and terror activity may coevolve and 
can contribute to the fluctuations in growth and decline of terror enterprises. This 
coevolution happens over time in which each side employs adaptations in response 
to escalations. The force of counterterror measures may instigate selective pressures 
on recruitment that can influence the dynamics of their relationship. Population 
cycles can lead to fluctuating selection, so that the evolution of terrorism may occur 
indefinitely and can reciprocally influence counterterror dynamics. It is important to 
note that interactions governing ecological dynamics continually change through 
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rapid evolution.53 Predicting the outcome of such interactions is of interest to 
counterterrorism researchers as they try to understand sustained recruitment. In this 
context, testing effectiveness of policies and targeted actions will help researchers 
design robust adaptive guidelines against terrorism. In parallel, researchers must 
also understand the evolutionary dynamics of terrorist recruitment. 
 
This article demonstrated that studying the interplay between terrorism and 
counterterrorism has much policy relevance. First, the knowledge of terrorist trends 
can inform forecasting and counterterror policies on the inherent risks of different 
levels of counterterror campaigns in shaping future terror attacks. Second, 
governments must ascertain the effectiveness of its counterterror measures with 
regard to terrorist recruitment, so that it can discontinue ineffective programs. It is 
important to take measures to counter the alienation of communities where terror 
groups recruit. Instituting counter measures is vital in curtailing terror groups’ 
membership. The recruitment process is not an isolated phenomenon; it is 
immanently linked to issues such as marginalization and questions of political and 
religious identity.54 Anti-terror operations are the visible elements in curbing the 
threat of terrorism, however, while indispensable, may not address the roots of the 
problem.55 Taarnby argues that it is at the level of socially disparate groups that 
recruits to Jihad can be found, and this is outside the scope of the security services.56 
Furthermore, the recruitment efforts of a group will not be mitigated, or halted by a 
one-size-fits-all prescription; this necessitates the incorporation of various counter 
recruitment measures.57 Much more research is needed to understand the 
complexities involved in the process of recruitment. Herein, we have offered ways to 
study the patterns of terror activities and the conditions under which they can be 
contained. We hope to formulate effective responses to counter recruitment in future 
studies. 
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